[GIP-19] New GoodDAO Voting System

GIP: 19

Title: New GoodDAO Voting System

Author: Jahanna Patterson

Status: Stage III

Track: Meta/Proclamation

Created: 2023-11-19


New GoodDAO Voting System

GoodDollar is a powerful project with an ambitious aspiration: to ensure that, in every corner of the world, each person has the possibility of receiving their universal basic income without any political, social, cultural, educational and, of course, economic factors being an impediment to achieve this end. GoodDollar is a project conceived for the community and it seeks to be directed by its own community through its decentralized governance system, the GoodDAO. The project has managed to remain stable from day 1 and has gone through several stages to reach the position it has now. Like any project, it had and will always have to mutate and evolve to satisfy the needs of the market and those of its own community; always maintaining its philosophy and values as a guiding principle.

The layout of the current GoodDAO system is supported using GOOD as a governance token, which has no commercial value, is non-transferable and can only be acquired by claiming the UBI or by staking. Each unit of this token is equivalent to 1 vote and there are no limitations on the number of tokens each individual can own.

This proposal seeks not only to demonstrate that the modification of the current voting system is imperative, but it also seeks to solve it from an approach in which the parties (claimers and supporters) are satisfied and correctly represented. Solution that can be carried out without additional costs, developments, applications or platforms, and aims to use the premises of GoodDollar (the project) as a flag and replicate them in the GoodDAO in the most democratic way possible through the system explained below:

Forked Universe Voting System

Where the total universe of GOOD token owners is divided into two sub-universes, the first being the Supporters (holders with more than 300k GOODs) and the second being the Claimers (holders with less than 300k GOODs). Of the total universe, which is equivalent to 100% of the votes for a proposal, the voting weight of the sub-universes will be distributed 22/78 respectively.

To vote on a proposal and taking into account the current channel to do so (Snapshot), it would be necessary to open two voting processes per proposal, one for each sub-universe, since this platform we currently use to cast our votes has mechanisms to segment voters by their voting power, among other features.

In both processes, the options to vote will be displayed normally as has been done until now. Each process, destined for a sub-universe, will totalize its votes based on 100% internally. The percentage of each option to vote will be divided by the percentage of voting weight of each sub-universe and then, the votes of both processes will be added to obtain the real results of the proposal vote.

The mathematical operation would be the following:

Result = (Percentage of the Supporters’ Votes * Percentage of Vote Weight) + (Percentage of the Claimers’ Votes * Percentage of Vote Weight)

In a practical example, to approve a proposal, Supporters voted 68% in favor, 22% against and 10% null; while the Claimers voted 30% in favor, 50% against and 20% null:

In favor = (680.22) + (300.78) :arrow_right: 14.96 + 23.4 :arrow_right: 38.36

Against = (220.22) + (500.78) :arrow_right: 4.84 + 39 :arrow_right: 43.84

Null = (100.22) + (200.78) :arrow_right: 2.2 + 15.6 :arrow_right: 17.8

In this case, the proposal would be rejected with 43.84% of the votes, 38.36% in favor and 17.8% null.

These percentages of voting weight are a necessary measure to ensure the Claimers have real mathematical possibilities of reversing the most extreme voting scenario: the adverse consensus (100% of the votes of the Supporters), where at least 65% would be needed to turn the result around.

In favor = (1000.22) + (350.78) :arrow_right: 22 + 27.3 :arrow_right: 49.3

Against = (00.22) + (650.78) :arrow_right: 0 + 39 :arrow_right: 50.7

Null = (00.22) + (00.78) :arrow_right: 0 + 0 :arrow_right: 0

This is a scenario with a high probability of being fulfilled if we consider that, of 17 voting processes, in 14 of them, all voters with more than 400k GOODs casted their votes in consensus for the same option.

To increase the fairness of the process, 4 additional conditions must be met:

1- A minimum voting threshold must be established for both sub-universes of voters and thus prevent decisions from being made by a few. To do this, the number of votes that would be classified in each sub-universe must be determined to establish a double quorum.

2- The voting period must be long enough to maximize participation.

3- The vote must be secret until the processes close, to avoid trend voting and as an attempt to reduce the alteration of the results due to Sybil.

4- The proposals must be rewritten in a simplified and well-explained terminology for it to be understood by as many people as possible. Also, the pros and cons debated in Discourse must be briefly present to guarantee, as far as possible, that each voter has enough elements to cast their votes having evaluated the proposal thoroughly.

Bonus: We must work towards integrating, as near as possible, the process of discussing and voting on proposals directly in the wallet to simplify the steps and make it much more accessible and practical for the widest spectrum of community members possible.

With this new system, an increase in participation in GoodDao is guaranteed due to the revaluation of the Claimers’ votes, since they will be able to truly influence the decisions. All this without depreciating the value of the Supporters’ votes, because they will still be the basis of each electoral process (although their percentage of voting weight will be lower, their weight of the voting tendency will continue to be decisive for the general result), thereby achieving a governance that is increasingly closer to what defines a DAO. For all, with justice and equity.

WhatsApp-Image-2017-09-19-at-7.21.52-PM-650x3651

6 Likes

Hello! I have a suggestion regarding the voting explanation. I find it somewhat difficult to understand exactly what changes are being proposed regarding the weighting of each vote and the evaluation method. The voting standard (weight of each voter, supporter, and how it is defined) is not very clear, even with the provided example. It is crucial to clearly outline the changes in each proposal and make them as understandable as possible for everyone.

Additionally, I think it’s important for you to consider the proclamation format. I’ve attached it below so you can adjust it to your proposal.

Blockquote


GIP: N/A
Title: Title
Author: Name (GitHub username)
Status: Stage III
Track: Proclamation
Created: YYYY-MM-DD

Insert title like “GIP-X: Example title” here

Proclamation text

Motivation for writing this proclamation

Disclaimer, I recognize this is a governance proposal is actually just a signaling request to the GoodDAO community for feeding back GoodDollar Foundation about the operations and assets management under the Foundation accountability.
Although the Foundation will act in Good Faith to follow the communities mandate, the commitment to it shall be evaluated case by case, so it will be only the GoodDollar Foundation the one taking the final decision about it.

I very much agree with this proposal, I support it 100%

2 Likes

Hola Andrés! Thanks for the feedback!

I’ll add a summary to clarify the proposal´s foundations. Regarding the format of the track, I was in sort of a dilemma since I thought this proposal was an hybrid between the Meta and the Proclamation one, but you´ve made me realize it fits better in the Meta track, so if you could give me guidance of how should I fill the File changed (AGP-0) and the Link to proposed change fields, I would be very grateful.

Thanks in advance!

1 Like

I believe that combining a proposal could be counterproductive in increasing the chances of approval, especially when dealing with Meta and Proclamation matters. However, it is your decision if you decide to continue making both proposals at once.
It is crucial that the proclamation is clear, and governance changes are transparent. I recommend referring to GIP-0 to review the format of both the proclamation and the meta change.

In your proposal, it’s not clear what the proclamation is, and to whom it is addressed. These suggestions are meant to help you improve the proposal and meet the essential requirements for its launch.

1 Like

Yes, I prefer to adhere the proposal only to the meta track, what is not clear to me is how I should fill out the last two fields of said format (the ones I mentioned in my previous comment). Additionally, how do I modify the proposal if I cannot edit the original post? Should I do it in a comment? Thanks again!

Please write to me on Telegram and I will help you organize what you need
my user is: @MAMQ01

1 Like

I support the ideal. But the border between Supporters & Claimers should not be based on 300K GOODs owned as a fixed number. Almost of claimers now have under 10K GOODs.
I propose the other way that can bring more equity.
For example: in a voting for master A:
10% number of users voted For
70% number of users voted Against
20% number of users voted Abstain
=> result For = (10% x total GOODs voted For) / 20% Abstain
result Against = (70% x total GOODs voted Against) / 20% Abstain
result Abstain = total GOODs voted Abstain
In case no one voted Abstain => assign number of users voted Abstain = 1 and total GOODs voted Abstain = 1.

Well, we’re lacking of some information that could result helpful to set the apropiate border and to set the double quorum threshold (the quorum for each sub-universe) in an easier way. I. e. the amount of GOODs currently owned by the whole community (supporters and claimers).

Now, can you explain your counter proposal more in detail? You want to multiply the votes% * the total amount of votes (knowing that 1 GOOD = 1 vote)? Would this apply to all the universe of voters?

Feel free to drop all your thoughts. This proposal will be reformatted soon, so this “topic” will remain open to collect feedback until the update is published.

Thank you all for your contribution for this proposal

Hello, I believe your proposal addresses an issue that requires reflection and action to ensure that votes accurately represent the reality of the ecosystem’s population. I myself have nearly 900k GOODS, so when I vote, the impact on the final result is significant, which doesn’t make me feel entirely comfortable. At the same time, I don’t want to abstain from voting.

It is also true that to accumulate such a volume of GOODS, I have been investing time, enthusiasm, and even some money since the project’s inception to contribute to its sustainability and progress. Does this give me any special rights? I don’t believe it does, but I do think that in some way, this effort should be recognized, not for what has already been done, but for the perspective and broader insight I can offer based on it. This perspective may not hold inherent value as a dogma, but perhaps, and I stress “perhaps,” it can hold some value.

That being said, thank you for bringing up this topic, and I hope a good proposal develops from it. In the voting for the emerging proposal, I commit to abstain, casting my vote but doing so as an act of abstention.

There is a problem for those of us who believed in GoodDollar from the beginning and bet money from the first minute. That hierarchy in voting power must be respected, but now new people like you have arrived who are working hard on the project, and I think we should also give them voting power. We must look for practical mechanisms, for example, limiting voting power to certain amounts. We could also start to think about giving commercial value to the GOOD token, since if a person wants to increase their voting power, those of us who have more GOOD could share part of our GOOD with these people, and thus bring the voting power to equal levels. . .

For example, we do the voting “New GoodDAO Voting System” and have 12 users voted.
In which, 1 user has 12K GOODs (called as U1), and 11 users have 1K GOODs per person (called as U2-U12).
If we apply existing mechanism voting, the result will belong to U1 voted, don’t care the other people vote.
If applying my proposal mechanism voting, the result will be different in some cases.

*Case 1: U1 voted Against. U2-U12 voted For. No one voted Abstain. The calculation as the following:
Because no one voted Abstain => assign 1 virtual user who has 0 (or 1) GOODs voted Abstain, then:
=> % Abstain = 1/13 = 7.7%
% Against = 1/13 = 7.7%
% For = 11/13 = 84.6%
=> GOODs voted Abstain = 0
GOODs voted Against = (7.7% / 7.7%) x 12K = 12K
GOODs voted For = (84.6% / 7.7%) x 11K = 121K
=> 121K For vs. 12K Against => For win

*Case 2: U1-U5 voted Against. U6-U12 voted For. No one voted Abstain. The calculation as the following:
=> % Abstain = 1/13 = 7.7%
% Against = 5/13 = 38.5%
% For = 7/13 = 53.8%
=> GOODs voted Abstain = 0
GOODs voted Against = (38.5% / 7.7%) x 16K = 80K
GOODs voted For = (53.8% / 7.7%) x 7K = 49K
=> 49K For vs. 80K Against => Against win

*Case 3: U1-U2 voted Against. U3-U6 voted For. U7-U12 voted Abstain. The calculation as the following:
=> % Abstain = 6/12 = 50%
% Against = 2/12 = 16.7%
% For = 4/12 = 33.3%
=> GOODs voted Abstain = 6K
GOODs voted Against = (16.7% / 50%) x 13K = 4,333
GOODs voted For = (33.3% / 50%) x 4K = 2,666
=> 2,666 For vs. 4,333 Against => Against win. But if we need at least 5K GOODs to win => no one won, the voting should be redone.

In my formular, the power of U1 will be kept if he/she has enough allies. If no, the crowd will win.

Of course. And I completely agree with you. The contribution in time, participation and money must be respected, but it is also true that there is a mass of individuals (a majority) with a very low power of desition that deserves to have participatory weight, since no matter how much you invest in a project, it will not be sustained if there is no one to consume it. That’s why respect must always be reciprocal. This proposal aims to sincere the weights of participation without you, the Supporters, losing the weight of the voting trend. What do I mean? Regardless of the vote process, the Supporter sub-universe’s vote is the one that will always set the trend of the general vote, and the Claimer’s vote will be complementary but significant. That is why the discussion of each proposal and its subsequent detailed explanation at the time of the vote will take on even more relevance.

1 Like

This is a good option as well, I would love to see more feedback regarding your proposal. It would also be awesome that we all could brainstorm and build a final proposal that satisfy all interests of all parties.

1 Like

While I believe small holders should be given more power, I do not think this is the main problem.
I think most users don’t know about the governance process and not aware of the possibilities.
We also have the delegation feature, where people can give their voting power to a representative, but we don’t have a nice UI for people to do that and for people to propose themselves and representatives.
I’d much rather see a proposal for building such a UI or leverage existing solutions like karama.xyz for

  1. explain governance and the possibilites
  2. let G$ citizens propose themselves as representatives and allow them to market themselves.
2 Likes

Even we have a nice UI, I don’t think many people will vote for a representative, because the income from G$ is very very small, so they almost don’t care. Only people who love G$ may consider on a voting.

1 Like

I’m totally agree with this. Evenmore, it already is within de proposal but as a “bonus” because I think it would require a separated proposal just to discuss this topic. We need to optimize the whole voting system so we don’t need to go through at least 3 platforms to discuss and cast a vote. Particularly, I don’t see a merchant or a newbe in web3, doing all these steps to be able to vote. However, the main issue here is the fact no matter how easy the process could become, people won’t feel encourage to cast their votes if it doesn’t represent anything in a decision making scenario.