[GIP-27] Establishment of a dedicated "Stakers Rewards Pool."

GIP: [GIP-27] - Establishment of a dedicated “Stakers Rewards Pool.”

Title: Establishment of a dedicated “Stakers Rewards Pool.”

Author: Gooddollar2020

Status: Stage I – Work In Progress

Track: Protocol

Created: 06/16/2026


I believe the initial selection of the House of Alignment from GIP 26 may be counterproductive to the overarching mission and vision of G$.

Consequently, I would like to present a more robust proposal:


UBI Pool from 90% to 50%

New “Stakers Rewards Pool” from 0% to 40%

DAO Treasury from 10% to 10%


The new Stakers Rewards Pool is open to everyone with G$ to stake, not just for the initial selection of the House of Alignment.

This implies that any individual or project (open for all) with staked G$ seeking to receive a portion of the 40% pool in the new "New Stakers Rewards Pool.

This initiative is designed to enhance the protocol’s transparency and accessibility, and the anticipated competition is projected to further elevate the value of the G$ token.

For example:

In Day 1:

If the 40% New “Stakers Rewards Pool” contains 10M G$ and there is one person or project holding 25% of the total G$ staked, they will receive 2.5M G$, and the remaining 75% will be distributed to the other stakers according to their stake.

In Day 2:

If the 40% New “Stakers Rewards Pool” contains 40M G$ and there is one person or project holding 25% of the total G$ staked, they will receive 10M G$. The remaining 75% will be distributed to the other stakers according to their stake.


The initial selection for the House of Alignment can be funded by the Good Labs Foundation, enabling them to leverage their investment and generate daily returns from the “Stakers Rewards Pool” to enhance the utility of the G$ token and render it truly unconditional.

2 Likes

I would like to better understand how this proposal would apply to the community currently operating within the Fuse network. Considering the current daily volume limitations and the exit fees associated with the bridge to the main network, what will the technical process be for users and holders on Fuse to access this new rewards pool as easily and quickly as those already on the main network? It would be very helpful to know if the proposal includes any mechanism to facilitate this flow without the bridge restrictions affecting their participation .

Furthermore, how does this design protect the project’s economy from new investors who might temporarily enter the market attracted solely by staking returns? I’m concerned about whether there are mechanisms in place to prevent this floating capital from extracting value from the reward pool and then withdrawing its liquidity, thereby affecting the token’s price stability and the long-term growth that long-term holders have sustained.

3 Likes

Thank you for your response.

Regarding G$ Fuse holders, they have the option to utilize either Axelar or LayerZero for bridging assets from Fuse to Celo or XDC for a fraction of a cent. This can be accomplished via the Gooddollar Main Bridge, with comprehensive documentation available within the Gooddapp under the “Bridges Section” and “GoodDollar Main Bridge” subsection.

Regarding the latter portion of your inquiry, we propose implementing a three-month maturity period for staked assets. This measure would ensure that rewards from the “Stakers Rewards Pool” are only distributed to committed participants, thereby safeguarding the pool from speculative capital seeking to extract value without long-term engagement.

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I appreciate the clarity in the documentation regarding migration alternatives using Axelar and LayerZero for Fuse account holders. However, analyzing the terms presented from an economic and comprehensive sustainability perspective, I must be emphatic: the current proposal is unconvincing. The document leaves structural gaps and critical operational frictions that, far from encouraging the transition, generate distrust and jeopardize the participation of the main voting pillars of this DAO.

To make serious progress, it is imperative to clarify the following points:

Technical Bottlenecks and Bridge Restrictions: Any mass migration strategy must be based on the operational reality of the current infrastructure. Currently, the Fuse-Celo bridge has severe restrictions: a maximum daily transfer limit of 1 million tokens and a limit per individual transaction of 100,000 Good Dollars, subject to a 0.15 fee.

For wallets with significant positions that maintain the governance quorum, these limitations make migration an extremely slow, fragmented, and technically inefficient process. Forcing the execution of dozens of manual transactions exposes positions to prolonged operational risks for days on end. If the contract design doesn’t account for these liquidity and bridge speed constraints, the proposal is born with an insurmountable technical barrier for those of us who actually drive the protocol.

Uncertainty Regarding the Continuity of the Distribution Scheme: The greatest concern is that this process could become a point of no return, disabling previous incentives without a clear and equivalent alternative in the destination network. Long-standing participants would be permanently relinquishing their previous mechanisms for accumulation and governance distribution. Therefore, for the community to validate a three-month expiration period in a new network and assume the operational risk of fragmenting capital across the bridge’s boundaries, the “Participant Rewards Fund” must be structured as a pool that truly justifies the transition and is proportionate to the scheme being closed. Without clear and transparent figures, there is no logical incentive to blindly mobilize large volumes of capital.

To unlock the protocol and take the joint step we are all seeking, the rules of the game must be a symmetrical benefit for the entire community, not a containment strategy that operationally stifles the holders. I propose that any final draft include:

Financial Transparency: Precise numerical details and the projected annual percentage rate (APR) for this new Fund, demonstrating with facts the viability of the transition.

Preservation and Safeguarding of Political Weight (Institutional Guarantee Against Governance): An explicit and auditable technical guarantee in the code that ensures accumulated voting power (GOOD) remains intact, active, and globally computable during the 3-month lockout period. This measure is essential to dispel the legitimate distrust generated by the confrontational narratives that spokespeople like Sam McCarthy repeatedly promote within the community whenever the legitimate right to a negative vote is exercised. Decentralized governance cannot allow major quorum validators to be singled out or attacked for protecting their positions; therefore, political power must be cryptographically shielded against any attempt at isolation or institutional retaliation during the transition.

Guarantee of Continuity and Return to Governance Staking: The code must ensure that, at the end of the proposed 90-day period, a clear, automated, and enabled technical path exists for holders to transition their assets directly to a new, definitive staking mechanism for the GOOD token on Celo. This will prevent the temporary lock from becoming an irreversible loss of accumulation rights or a forced closure of long-term governance incentives.

Thank you so much for the proposal and for facilitating this exchange. You can always count on my willingness to engage in dialogue in the best possible terms, adding value and seeking solutions that benefit us all.

2 Likes

Your “Stakers Rewards Pool” idea is good. Besides the minimum 90‑day staking commitment, I think it should include a voting mechanism. All stakers would be listed for a monthly vote; voters must hold a minimum amount of GOOD tokens to be eligible, and each voter gets one vote. Rewards would be split into two parts and distributed based on each staker’s share of the staking pool (part 1) and their voting rank (part 2). Voting results would place stakers into three equally sized groups: Group 1 receives 50% of part 2, Group 2 receives 30%, and Group 3 receives 20%. For example, if an organization holds 25% of the staking pool and the monthly reward is 10M G$, and it ranks in Group 2, it would receive: 25% × 5M + (30% × 5M ÷ number of stakers in Group 2).

1 Like

Given the fixed supply of 2.2 trillion G$ tokens, the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is projected to decrease each month as additional tokens are staked.

The “Stakers Rewards Pool” can be utilized to distribute GOOD tokens to stakers based on their proportional stake, in addition to G$, thereby serving as a mechanism for GOOD distributions.

It is currently possible to utilize the primary bridge within GoodMarket to transfer an unlimited quantity of G$ from Fuse to Celo, with a fee of 20 Fuse.

Thanks again.

2 Likes

Thanks for your reply.

The “Stakers Rewards Pool” will also serve as a mechanism for distributing GOOD.

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There is already an approved proposal to give 5% of money creation for “Savings”.
There’s a pilot for that together with Ubeswap.

Rewarding people for staking doesn’t increase utility for the token, it simply encourages hording.
The vision for G$ is to become a currency people use.

GIP-26 aims to encourage projects to bring utility to the token together with accountability.
Projects and communities are expected to use the funds they get to increase usage of the G$ token, meaning more people will buy it to use it.

Projects that will not increase usage in their platform for the G$ token will be eventually voted out.

3 Likes

Thank you for your response.

You appear to have misunderstood the core objective.

The primary goal is to establish GoodDollar House of Alignment as universally accessible through the staking of G$ tokens.

Members of the House of Alignment are eligible to stake G$ in the “Stakers Rewards Pool” to secure ongoing funding from G$, thereby fulfilling their role in promoting G$ adoption and utility through a permissionless framework.

The fundamental principle of GIP-27 emphasizes the unconditional and inclusive participation of all individuals or entities within the “Stakers’ Rewards Pool.”

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Yes but you are missing the accountability part.

How do we measure their contribution to the growth? How do we hold them accountable if they do not contribute to growth?

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@sirpy, you raise a valid point about measuring growth, but I think we need to look at this through the lens of ecosystem expansion.

If we enforce strict accountability metrics before allowing participation, we risk creating a closed loop that stifles new, innovative ways to drive G$ adoption.

GIP-27 is designed to be the “on-ramp” where the primary accountability is the market mechanism: if a staker, project or community doesn’t actually use or promote G$, the market will naturally devalue their position, and the community will lose interest.


The “Stakers Rewards Pool” is meant to be a universal standard, not an elite club like the “House of Alignment”.

Just allow market forces to determine the outcome.

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Moreover, the Good Labs Foundation is capable of evaluating the accountability of the “House of Alignment” members through its contribution of G$ for staking within the “Stakers Rewards Pool”.

2 Likes

Yes, I believe a voting mechanism is the best solution for selecting organizations that serve the community well. This means the organizations are providing G$ utilities to a large number of people.

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As mentioned earlier, the Good Labs Foundation is uniquely positioned to evaluate the accountability of the “House of Alignment” members precisely because they are the ones contributing the G$ to the “Stakers Rewards Pool.”

The Foundation has the technical oversight and fiduciary duty to assess whether these members are actually driving adoption and adhering to the ecosystem’s goals. Their evaluation ensures that the funds staked are being used effectively, creating a direct line of accountability to the treasury rather than to a transient popular vote.


Each individual or entity is responsible for their staked or delegated G$.

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House of alignment is not an elite club.
As GIP-26 explains its members will be eventually voted in by the community.

Indeed it is :slight_smile:

Therefore, why not extend participation in the future of the G$ project to all interested entities and individuals?

It is plausible that an individual not formally associated with the “House of Alignment” could wield a more significant disruptive influence than an associated member.

An open innovation model is essential.

House of alignment will open to all participants.

The first cohort was curated by the foundation but going forward they will be voted periodically by the community.

I now see that this wasn’t clear in the proposal itself.
Please read @sam_mccarthy follow up here:

I hope that makes things clearer.

1 Like

@sirpy While the promise of future community voting is a step forward, an open innovation model cannot afford a “curated first cohort” phase.

By maintaining a gatekeeping mechanism for the initial round, we inadvertently create a two-tier system where only those vetted by the Foundation get to shape the future of G$, while potentially superior contributors are locked out.

True open innovation requires:

  • Immediate Access: Any entity or individual should be able to join the House of Alignment the moment they are ready to stake and prove their value.
  • Merit Over Permission: Accountability should be enforced by the market and the staked assets themselves, not by a pre-approval committee.
  • No Artificial Delays: Waiting for a “periodic vote” stifles the rapid iteration and diverse entry points that drive real ecosystem growth.

If we claim to value open innovation, let’s remove the gate entirely from day one. Let the staking mechanism be the only filter, not the House’s alignment discretion.

The foundation has the duty to make sure changes it proposes will work as expected and not be abused.

You are more than welcome to propose projects you think are aligned for the initial expriment.

Governance has to strike a thin balance between experts and openness.

I’m guessing you didn’t participate in the co-design process Sam led. You should have used that oppurtunity

With the aim of building consensus and facilitating a smooth transition to Celo, I wanted to ask directly if you have analyzed the feasibility of incorporating a symmetrical incentive structure into the fund’s final design. Consider this from a technical perspective: Incentives for Migration and Active Commitment: Any user who transfers and stakes their GOOD tokens to actively support Alignment House initiatives on Celo would automatically receive (via smart contract) a proportional distribution of liquid Good Dollar ($G$) incentives from the treasury fund. Governance Continuity: This same mechanism on the destination network would ensure—via code—that accounts continue to accumulate and maintain their governance voting weight, thereby protecting everyone’s participation rights throughout the transition. I believe this resolves the current situation and breaks the deadlock. Ultimately, it is about finding a balance where everyone benefits in a fair and inclusive way. I invite you to review and consider the feasibility of proposing this rule for the final contract.