GoodDAO 2.0: GoodDollar Governance Re-Vision Update

This is a promising direction. I especially support the idea of one-person-one-vote through the House of Citizenship. Giving every verified community member an equal voice can help build a stronger and more inclusive GoodDollar ecosystem.

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I actually have Been Blessed by the improvement of the new improved Good market. Thanks to the builder, we the community and every bit of people that came together to make this possible

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This is really interesting

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Thanks gooddollar builders

​A point that sincerely continues to cause me deep concern is that, for years, the protocol itself incentivized the community to participate, stake, and accumulate GOOD under a very clear premise: 1 GOOD = 1 vote. Many people dedicated valuable time, trust, and resources because that was the explicitly defined governance mechanism of the ecosystem.

​If a structural change is now being proposed toward a “one person, one vote” model through identity validation in the House of Citizenship, I still cannot find a clear technical explanation regarding what will happen to the GOOD token, what its future function will be within the smart contracts, and, more importantly, what message of predictability this sends to those who trusted the original rules of the game.

​I do not raise this to defend a particular interest, but because the stability and predictability of economic incentives are essential elements to sustain the security of any decentralized governance system. If the raw political power of the token is diluted to prevent concentration, it is vital to understand if GOOD will transmute into a financial backing utility such as a collateral or staking mechanism with yield distribution within the newly launched House of Alignment.

​I would appreciate a clear response regarding the precise role that GOOD will play in the architecture of GoodDAO 2.0. This is fundamental to clarify whether this transition truly strengthens the ecosystem’s decentralization or if, conversely, it leaves an asset without a clear function one in which the community and historical leaders have been deeply involved for years. Breaking the predictability of the rules puts our social capital and mutual trust at risk, which are the protocol’s most valuable assets.

​I look forward to your comments and clarity regarding this roadmap.

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Nice gooddollar saya sangat senang dengan pambaruan nya

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El objetivo es avanzar hacia la participación de comités comunitarios en lugar de que la fundación lidere el proceso.

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Si los artífices de este plan confían plenamente en la seguridad de su modelo, deberían estar dispuestos a respaldarlo arriesgando sus propios puestos.

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La gobernanza seria se rige por números y reglas claras. El camino de los nuevos incentivos es el correcto para estabilizar el sistema. Sin embargo, para que este proyecto piloto tenga éxito y reactive el ecosistema, los recursos asignados deben tener un impacto real y significativo.

Once again, I want to raise this question because I believe it is one of the most important issues in this entire process. Throughout the GoodDAO 2.0 redesign, the future of the GOOD token has been mentioned several times. It appears in the introductory documents, Community Call agendas, and various discussions as something that will be “re-evaluated.” However, despite all these references, the community still has no clear explanation of what will actually happen to the GOOD token.

This is exactly why I struggle to understand the order in which this process is unfolding. The transition to a “one person, one vote” governance model directly affects the asset that has represented governance participation for years. Yet the community is being invited to debate this new model without first defining the future of the GOOD token.

What concerns me most is that this issue appears to be underestimated. The future of GOOD is not a minor technical detail—it is a matter of institutional credibility. If this question remains unanswered while the governance debate continues, many community members may conclude that the governance framework is being redesigned without first providing clarity about the asset that has represented participation and commitment to the ecosystem for years. That is not the message a process aimed at strengthening trust and governance should be sending.

Personally, I cannot support a discussion whose objective is to move toward a governance model that directly or indirectly replaces or diminishes the role of the GOOD token while its future remains undefined. I believe it will be extremely difficult to build genuine consensus among GOOD holders unless a clear proposal is first presented explaining its future utility, economic model, and role within the new ecosystem.

In my opinion, the logical order should have been the opposite. The community should first receive a clear explanation of the future of the GOOD token, and only then begin debating such a fundamental change as the “one person, one vote” model. Without that information, the discussion begins while one of the most important questions for the entire community remains unanswered. Transparency is not only about inviting people to participate in the conversation—it is also about ensuring they have the essential information needed to participate in that conversation with a full understanding of its consequences.

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:door: Knock knock…

:door: Knock knock…

:door: Knock knock…

:door: Knock knock…

:sweat_smile: Is anyone home in the House of GOOD?

I’m starting to think the GOOD token entered the witness protection program… :joy:

Or maybe every time someone asks about GOOD, everyone suddenly looks the other way… :eyes::grinning_face_with_smiling_eyes:

I promise this will be my last knock for a while, but I think many GOOD holders would really appreciate even a small update.

Even a simple “we’re still working on it” would go a long way.

Thanks! :folded_hands:

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Hi Glenn, thank you for your engagement.

The short answer here is that I do not yet have specific answers regarding GOOD’s future utility, economic model, and role within the new governance system, and that “we’re still working on it.”

However, I have consistently expressed that the GOOD token has not been effective at achieving its original objectives, such as distributing control, stimulating valuable community contributions, or providing incentives to grow demand in G$, and I have doubt that GOOD will be able to help us achieve any of our objectives moving forward. After many years under the GOOD system, it’s apparent that we still have highly centralized control, significant barriers to participation, limited community engagement, and stagnating demand for G$, and so I think its right to question its role (just as we would with any contributor not following through on their responsibilities). In my opinion, the system that is currently built around GOOD is broken and we need to fix it. Again, this is not unique to GoodDollar and we see DAOs across the entire industry making the necessary changes.

I also question your assertion that the majority of the community has consistently pointed out that the one person, one vote model has structural flaws that expose the protocol to governance capture. I see these concerns coming only from you and Eddie. Meanwhile our governance calls have consistently been attended by 20-30 active members of the community who have not expressed such sentiment. There are risks, such as the Sybil and collusion problem, which are well-known and would be taken into consideration should a formal proposal around such a system arise. In fact, as I’ve pointed out before, the CoGov process (which invited the community to participate in the calls and over the forum) resulted in the following conclusions:

  • There is a desire to explore alternatives to universal token voting

  • One-person one-vote (vs. token-weighted voting) represents greater alignment with GoodDollar’s values

  • Inclusive governance is more appropriate for high-level strategic decision making and accountability, while expert-driven autonomous teams should drive execution

As these contributions came directly from the community, they will certainly play a role in how we design the system moving forward.

What I can say, and what will become more apparent with my next proposal, is that we want to be putting more execution responsibility into the hands of more context-aware, expert groups so that we can make better decisions for the ecosystem and for the growth of G$. However, we will never sacrifice the accountability that these groups have to the wider community. What long-term role GOOD plays in that accountability layer is still being considered.

I agree that this is a significant issue that needs the attention it deserves and I want to make sure we continue to move forward together with the community.

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Thank you, Sam, for taking the time to respond. I really appreciate the clarification and your openness in acknowledging that the future role of GOOD is still being worked on.

I hope that, as GoodDAO 2.0 continues to evolve, the community will have a clear vision for GOOD before moving too far ahead. I believe that clarity will help build trust and allow both current holders and new participants to better understand their role in the future of the ecosystem.

I also believe that defining the long-term role of GOOD will be an important part of the overall success of GoodDAO 2.0, so I look forward to seeing how that discussion develops.

Thanks again for the honest response, and I look forward to reading the upcoming proposal.

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I’ve been following the governance discussions for a while, and one thing stood out after GIP-26: the biggest issue wasn’t simply that the proposal failed. It was how disconnected the discussion and the final voting outcome seemed to be. If most concerns only become visible after the vote, then the governance process itself needs improvement, not just the proposals.

I think experimenting with the House of Citizenship is worth trying. A one-person-one-vote approach won’t solve every problem, but it could give contributors who are active in the ecosystem, yet don’t hold large token positions, a meaningful voice. Governance should reward participation and long-term commitment, not only capital.

I’m also curious about how the Treasury Committee will be evaluated. Rather than focusing only on spending approvals, I’d like to see measurable goals: growth in active users, G$ circulation, integrations, retention, and transparent quarterly reports. If a committee isn’t delivering results, there should be a straightforward process to replace its members.

Finally, I hope the House of Alignment pilot shares both successes and failures openly. Even if some experiments don’t work as expected, that information will be valuable for designing a stronger GoodDAO 2.0. Transparent iteration is better than pretending every governance experiment succeeds.

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I love the fact that Gooddollar puts the community first in all they do…great work guys

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The Treasury Committee mentioned in this update is now moving forward. GIP-28 is open for community discussion.

This proposal authorizes the formation of GoodDAO’s first expert execution body — charged with developing the committee’s mandate and first community-approved budget. It does not yet authorize the committee to move, spend, or deploy any treasury funds. Any use of treasury funds will require separate GoodDAO approval.

This is a first important step in activating a treasury that has historically been under the custody of Good Labs, and gradually distributing management responsibility and decision-making power to the DAO — so that treasury stewardship becomes both more decentralized and more competent.

Read the proposal and share your thoughts:
https://discourse.gooddollar.org/t/gip-28-gooddao-treasury-committee/9056

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Good morning my fellow members,

Let the committee have spending limits or require community approval for larger allocations.

As a matter of fact the administration of GoodDao needs to be examine critically in order to run he GoodDollar through management by objective (MBO) for that effective execution of the Community’s aim and objectives.

The first and foremost, you are the ones invites the members of the public to claim daily through the aids of Universal Basic Income (UBI), Since the process is not a work of father christmas, it deemed proper for the GoodDao to impose a sanctions on the members of the community that claim everyday in such a way that anynody fails to vote will be given a sanction of either suspension to claim for the period of one week with a warning and if such warning persist for three consecutive times such member should be expel from the GoodDollar community, At least, it is proper and humane to have a vote of thanks to hand that feeds you rather than an implicit curse.

Secondly, let the community have spending limit and the approval of the Community members and also transparency is needed to avoid ambiguity and a daily notification throughout the week in the GoodDollar as the priciple of (Caveat Emtor) as applicable to all valid contract of any Community and such invitation should be made available in this forum and in the Forum of telegram for community members to vote. May be some members don’t vote because they do not come across the notification, in fact if needs be let stop all activities in the forum only for voting process for good 7 days throughout so as to foster the spirit of the voting process.

Thank very much, I remain yours sincerely,

Yakubu Ibrahim

(Dankwarai002)

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